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Florida spiny lobster industry. Two models Florida increased from 1.9 million pounds in were estimated. First, a bioeconomic model 1954 to 6.6 million pounds in 1974 [1], a gain of relating yield to fishing effort over time where 239 percent. Florida landings currently acthe biological stock was allowed to vary was count for 94 percent of U.S. spiny lobster estimated to provide data for evaluating and landings. Total Florida spiny lobster landings designing aggregate industry level managehave declined since 1974 for two reasons. First, ment strategies [3, 4] . A second model was estiprohibition of Florida fishermen from lobster mated to represent an individual firm's harfishing on the Bahamian continental shelf revest function for 1974 stock levels. duced landings considerably. Florida landings
The authors' study, relating to the second declined approximately 3.5 million pounds bemanagement level, is an analysis of the firm's tween 1974 and 1975 , mainly because of the harvest function. The model was estimated to loss of the domestic landings which were determine production relationships for the caught in Bahamian waters. Second, domestic 1973-1974 stock level which is particularly landings from Florida waters appear to have significant because subsequent time series rereached a maximum in 1974 and have since research [3, 4] and recorded landings [1] have sugmained relatively stable or declined slightly.
gested that the 1973-1974 season was near the U. S. demand for spiny lobster increased conoptimum level in terms of sustainable catch in siderably more than domestic production in Florida waters. the past two decades. The resultant higher
The purpose of the analysis was to provide prices have caused considerable expansion of information for decision making for individual effort in the fishery. The rapid increase in lobster firms and to provide estimates of proinputs has caused declining catch rates, overduction relationships for use in the analysis of investment, and a potential for overexploitaaggregate industry level management protion of the spiny lobster stock. The need for an grams which might be imposed at current or effective management program is recognized optimum stock levels. Spiny lobsters have by the industry, management personnel, and been designated as a management unit by the researchers.
Fishery Management Councils authorized by Management of the fishery is appropriately the Fishery Conservation and Management considered at two levels. One is the aggregate Act of 1976 [2] . industry level where total fishing effort is conThe Florida Keys region, the study area, prosidered over time and where the long-term vides more than 80 percent of Florida domestic effect of fishing on the stock is of prime imporlandings of spiny lobsters. A random stratified tance. 1 The other management level is that of sample was taken, which consisted of 25 interthe individual fishermen who must determine views of lobster fishermen (firms), to obtain the economically efficient level of effort to information on production inputs, costs, devote to a given stock level. Also appropriate landings, prices, fishing techniques, and area in context of the second management level is fished. analysis by management personnel of expected effects of fishery regulations at given stock THEORETICAL MODEL levels. That is, if fishing effort is to be regulated, what effect will alternative plans have Spiny lobster production is carried out by inon economic efficiency and what alternatives dividual private firms. Each firm consists of are available for management? one boat and one captain. Often no crewmen In 1976, an economic analysis was completed are involved other than the captain. Because of for alternative management strategies in the the relatively shallow inshore water, fishing "'Effort" as used throughout this article refers to any or all of the input variables-traps (x,), rounds per week fished (xg), weeks fished (x,), and craft size (x,). Also, "stock" is defined as the total biomass of spiny lobsters that may be landed. trips are of one day or shorter duration. Aptraps once a week. Total number of weeks proximately 95 percent of the commercial fished (x,) in Florida is limited to a maximum harvest is done with spiny lobster traps [1] .
of 36 weeks by law, which defines the fishing In this analysis the trap represents the prinseason. Not all fishermen choose to fish the cipal unit of effort through which the traditotal 36 weeks because mackerel fishing and tional factors of production (labor, capital, and stone crabbing are more profitable during the management) are employed. The intensity with latter stages of spiny lobster season. Firm size which traps are fished was included in the and/or capital investment (xJ) was measured analysis through variables measuring the frewith a proxy variable defined as the square quency with which traps were pulled each week footage of the hull. and the number of weeks fished. These
Variations in harvest levels due to quality intensity variables adjust trap use among differences in fishing grounds caused by biofirms in the cross-sectional survey and also logical or physical factors were accounted for represent additional use of traditional producby including a qualitative variable having tion variables such as labor and capital. For example, the expected marginal catch from month of the season, and the number of times a using more traps depends on rounds per week, trap was fished before lost. Rounds per week x 2 , and weeks fished, x 3 . Traps per firm is the (x 2 ) was defined as the average proportion of principal unit of effort. Consequently, the foltraps pulled per week by each firm for the lowing discussion concentrates on this season. One round represents the pulling of all variable. Influences of x 2 , x 3 , and x, are ex-amined mainly in relation to their effect on MarginalLandings catch per trap, xl.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
The estimated parameters, 31, is interpreted to mean a 1.0 percent change in number of The harvest function presented in equation 1 traps fished per firm will result in a 0.76 perwas expressed in log-linear form, and its paracent change in landings. The marginal increase in landings due to the addition of one trap to meters and standard errors estimated by ordi-e addition of one trap to nary least square methods are presented in the typical or average firm with other variables equation 6.
held at mean levels is:
. importance in economic decision making and is the subject of the remainder of this article.
Hundred Traps
3The reader is cautioned not to sum coefficients 3, through f, for an estimate of economies of scale. Coefficients P3 through 3, are considered to be effects of time, technology, and geographic space. Expansion of all variables simultaneously probably would not produce the expected arithmetic results because, for example, (1) a limited number of lobsters are available for harvest each season from a given geographic area and (2) some factors of production, such as labor, are not explicitly included in the model. 4A few firms are actually fishing 2,000 or more traps.
'Extreme levels of traps considered are within the range of the data but their effects were estimated mainly for purposes of illustration as the resource would not allow all firms to produce at such levels.
are fished is limited. Moreover, in a given area for the average firm with approximately 650 the number of lobsters is fixed. If a greater traps can be expected to produce approxinumber of traps are fished in any given area, mately 13 additional pounds per season. catch per trap would be expected to decline.
Landings from any given number of traps A comparison of the output elasticities (pi's) fished per firm will be increased by increasing shows the marginal returns from fishing an the proportion of traps pulled each week (a deadditional trap are relatively greater than crease in set period). The estimate of p, shows marginal returns from increasing the othat as the firm increases its trap-pulling rate effort variables considered.
by 1 percent, landings will increase by 0.44 perMarginal products were evaluated with cent (equation 6). The additional expected landequation 7 for selected numbers of traps per ings from a marginal increase in trap-pulling firm. Estimates shown in Figure 2 were derate with xl, x,, and x 4 held at mean levels is determined by equation 8. from a change in number of weeks fished is cal-A firm fishing 450 traps and pulling traps at culated from equation 9 for mean levels of xl, the industry average of 0.83 times per week x 2 , and x. could expect to land approximately 14 additional pounds of lobsters for an additional trap (9) MPX, = 1093.46x* 6 27 9 fished at the same intensity as the previous traps (83 percent of the traps would be pulled Increases in number of weeks fished shift the per week, the trap would be fished 33.08 weeks marginal product function upward (Figure 3 ). of the 36-week season, and the vessel used to For example, a firm fishing 750 traps can exfish the trap would be 326 square feet in dimenpect to harvest an additional eight pounds of sion-i.e., beam x width). As the number of lobsters if it adds one trap to the total number traps is increased per firm, the expected addifished for 10 weeks. If the firm had fished this tional product decreases. An additional trap additional trap 20 weeks, the expected marginal product would have been a little over gives marginal product estimates of 27 pounds 10 pounds. Further increases in landings can and 4.6 pounds, respectively. be obtained by extending the fishing activities
The effect of vessel size on landings per trap to the legal maximum of 36 weeks. However, is illustrated in Figure 4 . Added vessel size most of the returns would come within the first shifts the marginal product estimates upward, few weeks. When the number of weeks fished but for each increase in vessel size the increase was doubled (10 to 20 weeks), only approxiin landings becomes smaller. Increased vessel mately two pounds were added to the size often is correlated with more efficient gear estimated marginal product per trap. The averwith which to locate more productive grounds. age number of weeks fished was 33.08 weeks.
Also, larger vessels tend to be more seaworthy, The declining productivity of fishing addithus allowing safe fishing in more turbulent tional weeks is due to the fact that the total weather. number of available lobsters is relatively fixed during any one season. Therefore, as additional Optimum Levels of Effort weeks are fished fewer lobsters are caught in the latter weeks.
The marginal analysis indicated that margiThe final variable considered is vessel size, nal returns in terms of pounds landed were or marginal factor costs of each input are reper pound for whole lobsters. Marginal value of quired to make this determination. These data product was estimated for different levels of are unavilable for several reasons. First, inputs trap usage by multiplying $1.08 times the estias defined represent a combination of inputs mated marginal products per trap which were such as labor, wood, and fuel that normally are estimated at mean levels for x 2 , x 3 , and x 4 and purchased in the supply markets. Thus, no reported in Figures 2, 3 , and 4. The marginal unique factor prices are obtainable from product function is shown in Figure 5 along market data. Second, an attempt to estimate with the marginal value product function. marginal factor costs simultaneously by regressing total cost on levels of input use by FIGURE 5. MARGINAL PRODUCT, multiple regression provided estimates that MARGINAL FACTOR COST, were highly correlated. For example, the cost AND MARGINAL VALUE of an additional trap fished is a function of the PRODUCT FOR NUMBER OF number of weeks fished, x,, the intensity of TRAPS FISHED, FLORIDA fishing effort, x 2 , and the size of craft, x 4 . These SPINY LOBSTERS same interrelationships are present when the 16 costs of X 2 , X 3 , and x 4 are considered.
To provide some indication of optimum The optimum solution in terms of traps dicated the number of traps fished per firm exfished may be differentfor individual firms for plained 74 percent of the variation in total cost several reasons. Most likely reasons among individual fishermen. The constant are differences in marginal factor costs and individual firm deviations in levels of x2, x3, and term, $1,876, represents fixed costs per firm fm deviations in levels of x 2 x, and which do not vary with level of trap use. The from the mean levels used for these va ables in Figure 5 . number in parentheses is the standard error. lesi gure The $11.55 per trap is interpreted as an esti-
The estimated marginal factor cost is based mate of the marginal factor cost or "price" of a on an expected trap life of three years. It is trap. In this formulation, the $11.55 per trap likely that with increased fishing pressure represents not only the price of the trap, but expected trap life is actually lower or will dealso the cost of fishing the trap during the crease. shown in Figure 5 . Considering the upper equation 6 and then differentiating with bound, the optimum solution may be anywhere respect to x, as was done in equations 2 and 7. between 500 and 1,500 traps per firm, dependThis marginal product function would be evaling on where in this range the individual firm's uated at market prices for lobster and equated marginal factor cost is represented.
to the individual firm's marginalfactor cost of Firms in the sample which have the capacity an additional trap fished to determine the optito fish or are currently fishing about 1,500 mum number of traps. traps usually fish considerably less than the average of 33 weeks. Recall that in Figure 3 the MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH marginal product function shifts downward as IMPLICATIONS the number of weeks fished decreases. This effect would shift the marginal value product
Marginal products declined with increased function to the left in Figure 5 and thus the levels of effort-traps fished, rounds per week, optimum number of traps to be fished would be weeks fished, and size of craft-in the spiny fewer than the approximately 1,500 originally lobster fishery. Therefore, there are economic recommended. There are economic reasons limits to the level of effort by individual firms which justify fishing less than 33 weeks. Relawhen costs are considered. "Effort" should not tively large craft which have the capacity to be considered as a single unit because of the fish large numbers of traps have the interaction and substitution shown among the alternative of fishing in other fisheries. For individual units of effort. That is, combining example, the king mackerel net fishery and the x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , and x 4 into a single index for the purstone crab trap fishery are alternatives for pose of estimation would limit information larger vessels. For these firms it is more profitnecessary for complete analysis of alternative able to shift to one of the alternative fisheries management plans. When each variable is conbefore the end of the 33-week season, given sidered separately, the effects of alternative their physical capability and the declining regulatory policies are clear. For example, the marginal product of additional weeks fished same result can be achieved by reducing traps (equation 9). If this is the case, the optimum fished or by reducing the season, or some comnumber of traps would be fewer than 1,500.
bination of the two. Similar discussions are appropriate in terms Additional research on cost of inputs is of variations in optimum trap levels due to needed to determine simultaneously the variations in trap-pulling rates and size of boat optimal levels of x,, x 2 , x 3 , and x, when all are or vessel. A reduction in trap-pulling rate (invariables in decision making. Firms of various crease in the set period) and a reduction in craft sizes can be optimal in terms of number of size both have been shown to shift the margintraps fished at any one time in the industry beal product function for number of traps fished cause of asset fixity, outside employment downward (Figures 2 and 4) . Firms fishing less opportunities, substitute fisheries, and other than the mean levels for rounds per week and economic factors. Research on these tradeoffs craft size can expect to have marginal value and alternatives would provide valuable product functions to the left of the marginal information to individual fishermen as well as value product function in Figure 5 and thus the fishery management personnel. optimum number of traps would be lower.
Management personnel who have responsiExamples of firms for which rounds per week bility for a fishery management plan for and craft size may be below industry mean Florida spiny lobsters should consider several levels are (1) part-time firms which pull less factors pointed out in this research. If one obthan 83 percent of their traps each week bejective of a management program is economic cause of better income alternatives outside the efficiency, maintaining only those firms confishery and (2) firms which have fixed investsiderably above the average would be necesments in vessels of less than 326 square feet.
sary. However, if only these firms were allowed Firms with larger vessels, however, may to fish, a severe restriction on the number of optimally fish more than the 1,500 traps for firms in the industry would be necessary to mean levels of rounds per week and number of prevent overfishing of current or optimum weeks.
stock levels. The social cost of displacing firms The exact optimum number of traps obviousneeds to be investigated.
Limitation of the number of traps fished by price of $1.00 per pound. The marginal value individual firms often has been suggested as a product function illustrated in Figure 5 is at means of limiting effort. Because relatively the 1973-1974 market price of $1.08 per pound. large firms (in terms of number of traps fished)
At marginal factor cost of $11.55 per trap, the appear to be economically optimal, trap limitaoptimal solution is increased from approxitions may impose economic inefficiencies on mately 1,100 traps at a market price of $1.00 the industry.
per pound to nearly 1,500 traps for a market price of $1.08 per pound. A relatively small Continuous monitoring of a fishery managemarket price change calls for an increase of ment program is necessary. Consideration of nearly 400 traps in this case. This finding indiFigure 5 supports this conclusion. If the price cates a need for close monitoring once a proof lobsters were $1.00 per pound, the marginal gram is initiated, and, at least in part, explains product function would be the marginal value the rapid increase in number of traps in recent product function representative of a market years.
